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Abstract. In our society a rising number of people change their resi-
dence regularly. Insofar, mobility seems to be necessary even on Election
Day, which is the reason why an increasing number of eligible voters use
the opportunity of postal voting. Thereby, the abidance by the election
principles, especially the freedom and secrecy of elections, is automat-
ically transferred into the private sector. This would not be necessary
if eligible voters had the possibility to cast their vote in any preferred
constituency within the electoral area. Therefore, we investigate in this
work if and how vote casting in any constituency can be constitution-
ally compliant, while maintaining the current electoral system. We also
consider the integration of the new German electronic ID card for voter
identification and authentication.
1 Introduction
The use of various services over the Internet is part of many peoples’ everyday
life. Through this, it is no longer required that the individual is present at a
particular time or place to conduct its business. The need for this kind of mo-
bility exists independent of special events, thus also on Election Day. For this
reason, some countries provide postal voting in order to enable as many people
as possible to participate in the election. Postal voting was established in Ger-
many in 1956 with the third Federal Electoral Act [7]. Through this, voters who
were not able to visit a polling station because of health reasons or any other
issues were enabled to cast their vote at home. While in 1957 only 4,9 % used
this option, for the elections to the 17th German Bundestag in 2009, about 21,4
% took the opportunity of postal voting (ref. to Table 1 in [2]). The increase of
postal voters may be justified due to both: the rising mobility of the citizens, and
the relaxation of application requirements for postal voting. But the shift of a
democratic legitimized election to the private sector raises the question whether
postal voting in its present form is still constitutionally compliant and in par-
ticular if it complies with the public nature of elections [25]. However, postal
voting is an indispensable opportunity for voters, who cannot be present in the
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polling station of their constituency because of health reasons or for those that
cannot be in the election area on Election Day. In contrast, voters who are able
to visit a constituency within the electoral area should be offered the additional
opportunity to cast their vote in any preferred constituency. Through this new
voting channel, voters would be as mobile and flexible as when using the oppor-
tunity of postal voting, but they would cast their vote in an environment that
is controlled by the electoral committee. In addition the compliance with the
election principles would be guaranteed.
In the following, we consider vote casting in any preferred constituency in the
context of the elections for the German Bundestag on Election Day. Thereby,
we investigate different possibilities of this new voting channel. Furthermore, we
identify the advantages and disadvantages and compare all possibilities against
each other from a legal and technical perspective. We do not aspire to change
or suggest changes concerning the German electoral system, which means the
composition of the German Bundestag and vote casting by selecting a candidate
and the list of a party. While maintaining the current electoral system but voting
from any constituency, two issues should be considered carefully: one is how to
authenticate voters that vote in foreign constituencies and provide them with
the respective ballot, and the other one is how to return the ballot to the local
constituency in order to tally the votes.
This work considers legal implications of allowing voters to cast their vote
from any constituency in Germany and respective technical solutions in order to
realise this ambition. The findings of this work might also apply in countries that
have similar legal requirements to Germany, especially member countries of the
European Union (EU). However, legal requirements might be slightly different
even within the EU. Therefore, a similar analysis, which could consider or could
be based on this work, must be conducted for each country, individually.
2 General possibility of Vote Casting in any preferred
Constituency
According to § 1.2 in conjunction with § 2.2 Federal Electoral Act the territory
of Germany is divided into 299 electoral districts. Every electoral district is sub-
divided into constituencies. Thus, constituencies are the lowest spatial division
of the electoral area from an organisational point of view (ref. to § 2, m.n. 5 in
[29]). They are important in the context of casting the votes because they define
the place where to do so. According to § 14.2 Federal Electoral Act, voters can
cast their vote only in that constituency, in whose electoral register they are
recorded in. According to § 14.3 a) Federal Electoral Act, the casting of votes in
any preferred constituency within the electoral district requires the ownership of
a ballot record which is only given in case of applying for it within a prescribed
period.3
3 A ballot record entitles the voter to do postal voting or to cast her vote in any
constituency within the electoral district. For further information please see section
3.1.
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The casting of votes in any preferred constituency of the electoral area is not
compatible with the current regulations of electoral law. However, this is owned
to the election process and not to the constitutional regulations. For instance,
Article 38.1 sentence 1 of the Basic Law does not require that eligible voters cast
their votes only in the constituency they are registered in. In case the checking
of the eligibility to vote is guaranteed and it can be ensured that every eligible
voter casts his or her vote only once and personally (see section 3), voters shall
be able to cast their vote in any preferred constituency, not only in the one they
are registered in. As the election system shall be maintained, it must be ensured
that the cast vote is tallied in the constituency the respective voter is related to
(see section 4).
3 Checking of Eligibility
The following remarks apply in case voters cast their vote in the constituency
they are assigned to or in any preferred constituency.
3.1 Ballot Record
Voting by people from foreign constituencies could be made dependent on the
submission of a ballot record. Insofar, it could be referred to the current regu-
lations, whereas the grant of a ballot record is possible only on request, § 17.2
Federal Electoral Act, and voting by submission of a ballot record requires the
presentation of an official identity document, § 59 Federal Electoral Code. Thus,
in contrast to § 14.3 a) of the Federal Electoral Act, the possession of a ballot
record would qualify for vote casting in any preferred constituency within the
electoral area (and not only within the electoral district). This approach has the
advantage that no new infrastructure is required in order to check the eligibility
of voters in a foreign constituency. In that regard, the existing electoral registers
can be used for checking the eligibility of voters in a foreign constituency, similar
to postal voting. Those voters who have applied for a ballot record could cast
their vote in any preferred constituency. Those who have not applied for a ballot
record could cast their vote only in the constituency they are registered in.
However, this approach also has a number of disadvantages (which exist in
the current implementation as well, but would affect a larger number of voters in
our approach): The voter loses her right to vote in case she loses the ballot record.
Furthermore, a coercer could conduct a forced-abstention attack by requiring the
voter to hand out the ballot record. Both threats also exist in the current election
system. Voters, who have received a ballot record and lost it subsequently, cannot
refer to the issuance of it. The replacement of a lost ballot record is generally
not considered in order to prevent a double vote (ref. to § 17, m.n. 15 in [29]).
According to § 28.10 sentence 2 of the Federal Electoral Code, a new ballot
record can be issued only with a credible assurance of a lack of access until 12
o’clock the day prior to the election. A further disadvantage of this approach is
that only voters who have applied for a paper record within the prescribed period
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are able to cast their vote in an optional constituency. This could be solved by
sending paper records to all eligible voters. However, this would strengthen all
the disadvantages outlined above.
3.2 Centralised / Decentralised Electoral Register
If voting in any preferred constituency was provided the electoral committee
could - according to the current regulations - only check the eligibility of voters
registered in the respective electoral register. Thus, for checking the eligibility to
vote of voters from foreign constituencies, the electoral committee would have to
check the electoral register of the constituency the voter is registered in - easier
to implement - a centralised electoral register4, if this is legally permitted and
feasible.
A centralised electoral register could easily be produced in the presence of a
centralised Federal Register of Residents. However, a centralised Federal Register
of Residents is neither provided in the current Framework Registration Act [8]
nor in the Registration System Act for further development of the registration
system, which passed the Germany Bundestag on 6/28/2012 but stands in a
conciliation committee at the moment [11]. A draft which was written by a con-
sultant and published on 12/6/2007 [24] focused the application of a centralised
Federal Register of Residents. However, this concept was rejected by various data
privacy experts. The criticism was not against such a register in general, but ex-
plicitly against the number and type of data, which were listed and considered in
§ 3 of the draft to be stored in the register. This includes an unjustifiable inter-
vention in the law of informational self-determination, which results from Article
2.1 in conjunction with Article 1.1 Basic Law. Therefore, the establishment of
a centralised electoral register cannot be fundamentally rejected. According to
the principle of dedicated use in the Data Protection Law, voters’ personal data
may be used only for the specified purpose, namely to check the eligibility to
vote. Beyond that, the centralised electoral register may store only that data
which is required to check the eligibility to vote: first- and surname, birthday
and current residential address.5
3.3 Voter Identification and Authentication, and Access to the
Electoral Register
Classical Voter Identification and Authentication (I/A) Verification of
the eligibility to vote requires a prior identification and authentication of the
citizen. Currently eligible voters are notified in writing about their registration
in the electoral register. This election notification also serves as a proof of iden-
tity (ref. to § 14, m.n. 9 in [29]). According to § 56.3 of the Federal Electoral
4 The information on the centralised electoral register (server) can be replicated among
several servers in order to avoid a single point of failure.
5 The electoral registers get compiled on the basis of the population registers stored
in the registry offices. Insofar, the surname, the first name, the date of birth and the
residential address of eligible voters are transferred from one register to another one.
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Code, voters shall submit the election notification on demand of the electoral
committee. In case they do not submit the election notification, they must iden-
tify themselves. The submission of the election notification and the identification
document is not necessary in any case, but at the behest of the electoral commit-
tee. It is not required in case of personal acquaintance between the voter and the
electoral committee. However, the Federal Electoral Code does not permit the
inference, whether a particular identity document shall be submitted. In that
regard, each official document needs to be sufficient in order to provide a proof
of identity. Therefore, the document should include a photo, as otherwise the
verification of the identity is not guaranteed.
Electronic Electoral Register (EER) The right to vote can be checked
against the voters personal data, which are stored on the de-/centralised elec-
toral register. The transmission of personal data from the registration office to
public authorities is already intended in § 18 Framework Registration Act and
§ 34 Registration System Act in case the personal data is necessary to fulfill
their jurisdiction or necessary by the jurisdiction of the receiver to fulfill its cor-
responding tasks. In addition, according to § 14.1 sentence 2 Federal Electoral
Code, the electoral register can be maintained through an automatic process as
well.
The transmission of voters’ personal data, namely first- and surname and
current residential address, is necessary in order to check if the citizen is eligible
to vote and whether he or she already cast a vote. The personal data could be
transferred over a secured communication channel, for instance over telephone or
Internet, which is already intended according to § 39.3 Registration System Act.
The use of a telephone is impractical and therefore not further considered in this
work. The access to the electoral register over the Internet would be secured by
the application of standard cryptographic protocols for secure communication,
like SSL/TLS [31]. The main disadvantages of an electronic electoral register,
which is accessible over the Internet, are DoS/DDoS attacks. However, there are
a number of techniques in order to mitigate such attacks, e.g. as presented in [30]
and [21].
Regarding the transmission of personal data it is questionable, whether the
electoral committee, as the receiver of the mentioned data, can be classified as
a public authority in the context of the outlined regulations. On one hand, the
municipal authorities carry out the statutory work assigned by the Federal Elec-
toral Act on behalf of the federal government (ref. to No. 43 in [29]). On the
other hand the electoral committee acts as an election body for the municipal
authority. Insofar the personal data of voters could be transferred to the elec-
toral committee directly. Thus, the access of the electoral committee to electoral
registers of other constituencies is not generally forbidden.
EER and Classical Voter I/A By checking the eligibility to vote over the
Internet and maintaining the classical identification and authentication of vot-
ers, the electoral committee would have to enter the necessary data of the voter
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manually. The personal data of the voter could be taken by the presented doc-
ument, captured electronically and sent as a request to check the eligibility to
vote for the respective voter.
With this form of checking the eligibility to vote, a corresponding Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) [19] needs to be provided in order to ensure secure transmis-
sion of the personal data. This introduces additional costs. Another disadvantage
of this approach is that the personal data transferred is confidential and secure
only until the provided cryptographic encryption scheme is secure. Thus, an
attacker who intercepts the encrypted personal data, which is transferred over
the network, is able to determine who has participated in the election and who
has not. Furthermore, this could violate the secrecy of the vote, depending on
whether the ballot is electronically transferred and how it is transferred.
EER and (German) Electronic Identity Card for Voter I/A Electronic
identity cards (e-ID cards) have been already used in electronic voting for legally
binding elections. Hereby, the most prominent examples are Estonia [12] and
Austria [1]. Furthermore, the use of e-ID cards in electronic voting has been
proposed in many scientific works, for instance [3], [4], [9], [20] and [26], and has
been also analysed in [6]. In particular, the authors in [3] and [4] propose the
use of the German electronic identity card ”Der neue Personalausweis” (German
e-ID card) in electronic voting.
Thus, the eligibility to vote could also be checked with the German e-ID card.
The German e-ID card enables, due to its data fields, shown in Figure 1, and
particularly due to its eID-Functionality, the so-called Restricted-ID, a unique
service-related online authentication [16].
Fig. 1. Data fields of the German e-ID card (Source: [17], Figure. 13).
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Furthermore, the German e-ID card supports age verification, a query of the
place of residence and a pseudonymisation (Restricted-ID). These functionalities
could be used for checking the eligibility to vote as they provide the necessary
data, which can be compared to the corresponding personal data stored in the
electoral register. Figure 2 shows an abstract infrastructure and the interaction
between the involved components.
Fig. 2. Abstract Infrastructure and Interaction between involved Components.
By using the Restricted-ID functionality, neither the PC of the electoral com-
mittee6 nor the electoral register would know for which voter the eligibility to
vote is being checked. The electoral register can respond to the request, if a
Restricted-ID (voter) is eligible to vote or not, without knowing the particular
voter behind the Restricted-ID. However, the identity of the voter could be re-
vealed in case the cryptographic algorithms, which are used for the generation
of the Restricted-ID and for securing the Internet communication, are broken.
Besides intercepting the data transferred over the network to the electoral reg-
ister, an attacker also needs to know the public key of each German e-ID card
and the public key of the electoral register (eID-Server) [17].
Furthermore, if the electoral register (eID-Server) and the Certification Au-
thority of the German e-ID cards cooperate, even today they can assign each
Restricted-ID stored on the electoral register to the identity of the voter [4].
Therefore, storing the Restricted-IDs on the electoral server permanently must
be forbidden and the deletion of the stored Restricted-IDs must be verified by
the corresponding data protection expert. A long-term storage of data might
only be acceptable in case of a pending complaint requesting the scrutiny of an
election. However, the storage must be set up by the Federal Returning Officer
and controlled by the responsible data protection expert.
6 In Germany the authorisation of voters and the tallying of votes is carried out at
the constituency where votes have been cast.
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The authentication with the German e-ID card has a number of advantages
with respect to data privacy in comparison with the classical approach. Instead
of the voter’s personal data a pseudonym is transferred over the network. As the
Restricted-ID is unique in the context of the election, a voter trying to vote more
than once will easily be detected. Furthermore, citizens who have lost their right
to vote according to § 13 of the Federal Electoral Act can easily be identified as
well. Therefore, the so-called Country Verifying Certificate Authority (CVCA)
can publish a corresponding revocation list, which contains all election-specific
Restricted-IDs that are not allowed to exercise their right to vote. Depending on
the implementation, the successful checking of the eligibility to vote could either
be accepted by the electoral committee or by a voting machine which then might
enable the voter to start the vote casting process.
In addition, the electoral committee is not expected to enter the personal data
of voters manually, which is error prone and time consuming. However, it must
be considered that currently not all citizens are in possession of a German e-ID
card and therefore not all citizens can use the German e-ID card in the context of
checking their eligibility to vote. But the authentication with the German e-ID
card could optionally be offered to those eligible voters, who already possess this
document and have activated the eID-Functionality. Although, the principle of
the equal elections requires that every citizen shall be able to exercise his right
to vote in the same formal way (besides the equality of counter value and result
value), this does not mean that there can be only one option for vote casting.
In that regard, postal voting provides a different way of voting too but it is
constitutionally compatible since it is offered as an option and it strengthens
the principle of universal elections (ref. to page 125 in [13]). Finally, it has to
be said that since 11/1/2010 citizens applying for an identification document
only receive the German e-ID card. However, there is no obligation to exchange
the ”old” identity card. According to identity card law (ref. to § 6.1 in [22]),
German identity cards are valid for ten years. Therefore, ”old” identity cards
will be present until 10/31/2020. After this date, all eligible voters shall possess
a German e-ID card and could subsequently use it for authentication, if the eID-
Functionality has been activated. However, even after 10/31/2020, an additional
option besides the German e-ID card must be provided for identification and
authentication.
A regulation, which requires that voters can only be identified by providing
the German e-ID card, is not compatible with Article 38.1 sentence 1 Basic Law
because it violates the principle of universal elections. Thus, it is possible that
voters lose their German e-ID card just before the election or the German e-ID
card is stolen or missing. Therefore, the submission of another official document
which is suitable and intended for proving the identity of the owner shall be con-
sidered. Since the election technique proposed in this work allows vote casting
in any preferred constituency within the electoral area, the identification docu-
ment must contain the place of residence of the voter as well. This is necessary
in order to identify the corresponding electoral district, thus the votes will count
for the intended candidates. In this context, a German driving license is not
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appropriate because it does not provide information of the place of residence of
the owner. Thus, the election notification could still be sent to all eligible voters
in order to enable identification and authentication. The personal data of voters
on the election notification could be entered manually into the system by the
electoral committee. This is not objectionable from a legal point of view, because
according to § 14.1 sentence 2 Federal Electoral Code, the electoral register can
be maintained through an automatic process. Thereby, it must be ensured that
necessary data for checking the eligibility to vote is used only for the intended
purpose and can be transferred securely, for instance, by using cryptography.
Table 1 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of using manual (Poll
Workers) or automatic (German e-ID card) electronic voters’ identification and
authentication.
Table 1. Manual v.s. automatic electronic voters’ identification and authentication.
Manually (Poll Workers) Automatically (German e-ID)
Advantages Disadvantages
Compliant with the principle of - (not all citizens posses it)
universal elections
Disadvantages Advantages
Not long-term secure + (adversary needs more effort)
Error prone +
Time consuming +
– Transmit a pseudonym instead of voter’s identity
– Neither the PC of the electoral committee
nor the electoral register knows the voter’s identity
– Eligibility check can be performed
by the electronic voting machine
4 Vote Casting and Tallying
While maintaining the current election system and providing vote casting in any
preferred constituency, it must be ensured that each voter is provided with the
corresponding ballot of her constituency and that her vote is also counted in her
constituency.
4.1 Paper Ballot
In case vote casting is still done with paper ballots, there are two possibilities to
provide the corresponding voting ballot: either each constituency keeps enough
paper ballots from all electoral districts or the electoral committee prints the
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corresponding paper ballot on demand. The first approach requires that each
constituency provides enough paper ballots from all electoral districts in order
to enable vote casting for all eligible voters. This approach appears impractical,
because in Germany there are approximately 299 different ballots, and there-
fore not further considered. The tallying of votes can take place either in the
constituency, where the voter casts her vote or in the constituency the voter is
registered in. The first option violates the principle of the secret ballot in case
only one voter (or few voters) casts her vote in a foreign constituency. In this
case, the electoral committee knows what the respective voter voted for. The
second approach requires that the paper ballot is sent to the constituency the
voter is assigned to. Sending the paper ballot by post is not recommended be-
cause of the associated time delay. Another possibility would be to transfer the
paper ballot electronically over the Internet. In that regard, the only remaining
option is to scan and subsequently transfer the paper ballot to the respective
constituency. In order to ensure the principle of free and secret elections the
paper ballots would have to be scanned and transferred by the voter person-
ally. Afterwards, the electronically recorded ballot must be encrypted right after
scanning and transferred to the respective constituency over a secure channel,
e.g. using standard cryptographic protocols for secure communication over the
Internet, like SSL/TLS7. The votes (cast paper ballots) of other constituencies
must finally be sent to a central location, whereas ballot secrecy must be ensured,
for instance similar to postal voting.
This approach can be implemented in two ways: either using canonical ballots
or encoded ballots, like in [27], [23], and [10]. In the canonical ballot approach,
two major disadvantages are identified: First, electronic emissions might leak the
voter’s choice, thereby violating ballot secrecy. Second, it is technically not pos-
sible for the voter to verify, if the scanner has encrypted and sent her cast vote
without changing it. The major disadvantage in the encoded ballot approach
are the costs for special purpose equipment, special printers that are able to
print scratch fields, like in [27], or two layered paper ballots, like in [23]. Fur-
thermore, the verifiability of the proper ballot encoding is difficult to implement,
as poll workers must have access to the corresponding private key(s) of foreign
constituencies.
4.2 Electronic Ballot
As an alternative, voters could cast their vote electronically, directly on an elec-
tronic voting machine. In this case, the electronic vote could be transferred to
the respective constituency just at the point of voting or afterwards. In order
to ensure the principle of free and secret elections, the cast vote must be en-
crypted subsequently. For the sake of not interfering with ballot secrecy, two
different machines should be used for voter authentication and vote casting and
transmission.
7 In this context, tow technical “unresolved” issues must be considered: First, poll
workers must be able to check the SSL/TLS server’s certificate. Second, secrecy is
provided only as long as the used cryptographic mechanisms remain unbroken.
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A number of technical proposals for end-to-end verifiable electronic voting
schemes/systems, which enable electronic vote casting, can be considered for
directly implementing this approach, for example [5], [18], and [28].
In section 4.1, electronic emissions are an issue with respect to ballot secrecy.
Furthermore, costs for the provision and maintenance of electronic voting ma-
chines arise.8 However, end-to-end verifiable electronic voting schemes/systems
provide an increased level of verifiability in comparison with postal voting and
the traditional voting in the ”home constituency”. By using electronic voting
ballots, voters could also comprehend the impact of their cast vote much bet-
ter as the system provides appropriate feedback (e.g. regarding invalid votes).
Furthermore, this approach enables visually impaired people to cast their vote
personally. This strengthens the principle of direct elections as well as the prin-
ciple of secret elections, because these voters - in contrast to the regulations in §
57 of the Federal Electoral Code - do not need to take an auxiliary person into
the voting booth. Thus, they can cast their vote secret and personally. Thus, it
is conceivable that voters are informed about the validity of their vote.
Table 2 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of using canonical
paper ballots or electronic ballots on electronic voting machines for vote casting.
Table 2. Canonical paper v.s. electronic ballot on electronic voting machine.




+ Costs for the provision and maintenance
of electronic voting machines
Disadvantages Advantages
– Provides an increased level
of cryptographic verifiability
– Enables visually impaired people
to cast their vote personally
Time for returning the ballots +
to the appropriate constituency
– Voters can comprehend the impact of
their cast vote much better
Table 3 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of using encoded paper
ballots or electronic ballots on electronic voting machines for vote casting.
8 Note, these costs are lower than the one for special printers.
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Table 3. Encoded paper v.s. electronic ballot on electronic voting machine.
Encoded Paper Ballot Electronic Ballot
(on demand)
Advantages Disadvantages




is difficult to implement
– Enables visually impaired people
to cast their vote personally
Higher costs for special printers + (less costs for electronic voting machines)
– Voters can comprehend the impact of
their cast vote much better
The comparisons in table 2 and 3 show that electronic ballots on electronic
voting machines have more advantages, especially with respect to cryptographic
verifiability.
5 Summary and Discussion
In this paper we have analysed the application of vote casting in any preferred
constituency using the German parliamentary elections as an example. Thereby,
we have shown that a centralised electoral register cannot be declined in general.
Different approaches of voter identification and authentication, and checking the
eligibility to vote were discussed. The ballot record and the telephone are no
adequate solutions, while the manual input of personal data and the use of the
German e-ID card have both their advantages and disadvantages. With regard
to the vote casting and tallying, we have shown that both processes shall be
carried out electronically in order to provide vote secrecy towards the electoral
committee or any third party (e.g. an eavesdropping attack over the Internet) in
the best way. In this case cryptographic mechanisms are essential. This means
that the cast votes must be transferred in an encrypted form. Thus, the question
remains whether this approach complies with the principle of the public nature
of elections which has been modified by the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany in 2009. Thereafter, it must be possible for the citizen to check the
essential steps in the election act and in the ascertainment of the results reliably
and without special expert knowledge [14].
Cryptography is based on mathematical processes, which can be visualized
to some extent, but until now these processes cannot be illustrated in a way that
everyone is able to understand them, regardless of expert knowledge. Thus, the
principle of the public nature of elections - just as the election principles in Arti-
cle 38.1 sentence 1 Basic Law - is guaranteed without any reservation. However,
the nature of things entails that not all election principles can be fulfilled in total
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purity (ref. to page 124 in [13]). Insofar, the restriction of one election principle
is not unconstitutional per se, but may be justified as long as the constitution
contains a respective authorisation, the deviation ensures the national political
objectives or if the restriction is necessary in the interests of another election
principle (ref. to page 369) in [15]). Vote casting in any preferred constituency
could strengthen the principle of universal elections significantly. Thereby, those
people, who decided to travel on Election Day in the short term or to be ab-
sent because of any other reason, are given the opportunity to participate in the
election. Postal voting cannot provide this opportunity, as it requires an early
application for a ballot paper. Furthermore, in contrast to postal voting, the
moment of casting a vote would not be carried out in a private environment,
but would remain in a controlled environment.9 While voting in any preferred
constituency, the compliance with all election principles could be ensured and
controlled by the public, because everyone can see that the voter enters and
leaves the polling booth alone. Although postal voting is an indispensable vot-
ing channel for all citizens who are not able to visit a constituency within the
electoral area, it can be assumed based on the increasing number of postal vot-
ers, that this voting channel is also used by citizens who would not actually need
it. However, in order to ensure the election principles in the best possible way,
vote casting in any preferred constituency should be considered as an additional
voting channel.
In future work we will further analyse, if its application is constitutionally
compliant also in the context of regional and local elections. In that regard it
needs to be said that German states often establish the active right to vote with
a certain period of residence in the particular state.10 Furthermore, it must be
noticed that regional and local elections do not take place at the same time.
Therefore, vote casting outside the corresponding federal state or municipality
is only possible with very large organisational effort. Based on the findings of
this work, we aim to concretise the legal requirements for the establishment of a
centralised electoral register and to provide a practical solution for accessing the
currently distributed electoral register infrastructure. Thereby, we will focus on
both options for identification and authentication of voters, namely by using the
election notification, the German e-ID card or a combination of both. Finally,
we will analyse, if existing proposals for end-to-end verifiable electronic voting
schemes/systems, namely [5], [18], and [28] that could implement the approach
treated in section 4.2, comply with the findings of this work and fulfill the tech-
nical and legal requirements for electronic voting in Germany.
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10 For example § 2.1 No. 3 Electoral Act for the parliament of the State of Hessen.
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